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Abstract: This paper considers questions about continuity and discontinuity between life and mind. 
It begins by examining such questions from the perspective of the free energy principle (FEP). The 
FEP is becoming increasingly influential in neuroscience and cognitive science. It says that 
organisms act to maintain themselves in their expected biological and cognitive states, and that they 
can do so only by minimizing their free energy given that the long-term average of free energy is 
entropy. The paper then argues that there is no singular interpretation of the FEP for thinking about 
the relation between life and mind. Some FEP formulations express what we call an independence 
view of life and mind. One independence view is a cognitivist view of the FEP. It turns on 
information processing with semantic content, thus restricting the range of systems capable of 
exhibiting mentality. Other independence views exemplify what we call an overly generous non-
cognitivist view of the FEP, and these appear to go in the opposite direction. That is, they imply that 
mentality is nearly everywhere. The paper proceeds to argue that non-cognitivist FEP, and its 
implications for thinking about the relation between life and mind, can be usefully constrained by 
key ideas in recent enactive approaches to cognitive science. We conclude that the most compelling 
account of the relationship between life and mind treats them as strongly continuous, and that this 
continuity is based on particular concepts of life (autopoiesis and adaptivity) and mind (basic and 
non-semantic). 
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1. Introduction 
How are life and mind, respectively, characterized, and how are their relations to one another 
best conceived? 
In this paper, we start by examining this question from the perspective of the free energy 
principle (FEP). The FEP is argued to deliver an overarching rationale for brain functioning; to give 
a unified theory of perception, cognition, and action (and all other psychological capacities); and to 
suggest a framework by which to understand the relation between life and mind [1–3]. It states that 
organisms act to maintain themselves in their expected biological and cognitive states, and that they 
can do so only by minimizing their free energy given that the long-term average of free energy is 
entropy [4,5] (By “state” we mean a state in a system’s state space. One of the states that a system 
expects to find itself in is “to be alive”. Thus, a system will seek to reduce the probability of finding 
itself in a non-anticipated state relative to its generative model. In other words, by minimizing free 
energy, on average and over time, the system will self-organize the parameters of its internal states 
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to occupy a limited number of states, on average and over time ([6], p. 180)). Hence, to minimize free 
energy is to reduce disorder, in the sense of uncertainty.  
We then argue that there is no singular account of the FEP for thinking about the relation 
between life and mind (Or, minimally, there is no existing agreement on how best to interpret the 
properties of variational free energy for thinking about life and mind, and their relationship to one 
another). These different perspectives on the life-mind relation can be brought into view by 
considering the answer one would give to the following question: “Are mental phenomena restricted 
to living systems”? 
Some free energy formulations answer this question negatively. We call this picture of the life-
mind relation the independence view of life and mind. In the context of the FEP, it comes in at least two 
formulations, each of which has its own unique implications for thinking about life and mind, and 
their relation to one another:  
• The Cognitivist Free Energy Principle [6–8]. 
• The Overly Generous Non-Cognitivist Free Energy Principle [9,10]. 
The cognitivist free energy principle (cognitivist FEP) treats the relationship between life and 
mind as a contingent one. It is sometimes referred to as the self-evidencing brain hypothesis [7] or 
simply the predictive mind [6]. An independence view of this kind might still hold that some 
cognitive systems are living systems, but it will treat this particular relation as purely contingent, for 
example by associating minds with computational processes with semantic (i.e., contentful) 
properties, or by allowing for the possibility that minds could be realized wholly independently from 
life given the right kind of artificially supporting system. Such minds might be said to be 
epistemically secluded from the world, comprised of powerful generative models, which cannot be 
“necessarily wedded to biological organs” ([8], p. 7).  
The non-cognitivist free energy principle (non-cognitivist FEP) takes a very different starting 
point from the cognitivist FEP. The origins of the FEP were in thermodynamics, where non-equilibrium 
free energy theorems have been used to explain self-organizing dynamics in systems capable of 
remaining far from thermodynamic equilibrium [4]. In this sense the origins of the FEP have nothing 
intrinsically to do with life and mind, although it is now being directly applied to explain living and 
cognitive systems [2,9–11]. Overly generous non-cognitivist FEP is the view that all systems that 
maintain their variables within a limited range of values can be understood as having some form of 
mentality or proto-mentality given that the FEP casts any system that is able to maintain structural 
integrity in the face of a fluctuating environment as engaged in predicting its own future states. That 
is, retaining integrity rests upon processes the function of which is to maximize model evidence—i.e., 
these processes exhibit self-evidencing dynamics. Yet, this generous view of self-evidencing would appear 
to lead to some form of panpsychism.  
Other free energy formulations answer the question of whether the mind is restricted by life 
positively. These formulations are part of a more general picture of the life-mind relation we refer to 
as the dependence view of life and mind. There are different accounts in the literature, and common in 
all of these is that they subscribe to a much less generous but still non-cognitivist view of the FEP. 
We dub the possible accounts:  
• Non-Cognitivist FEP + Evolutionary Latecomer Views of Mind (e.g., [12]) 
• Non-Cognitivist FEP + Strong Life-Mind Continuity Views ([13,14] and this paper). 
Evolutionary latecomer views of mind emphasize discontinuities between mere living systems 
and cognitive ones, such that the properties of mind can be thought of as complexifications of the 
properties of life (see [15] for discussion of such views, yet in a slightly different context). For 
example, mentality, but not life, requires the existence of sophisticated generative neural machinery 
that is not present in simple forms of life such as single-celled organisms [12]. Hence, on this view, it 
is possible to be alive and yet not (necessarily) cognitive (Despite his defense of an action-oriented 
representational theory of mind, we place Clark [12] in the non-cognitivist FEP camp given his 
advocacy of the complementarity of FEP and predictive processing schemes with work in embodied, 
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extended and enactive approaches to cognitive science. We will have more to say about Clark’s [12] 
view in due course). 
In this paper, we shall defend non-cognitivist FEP and a strong life-mind continuity view based 
on recent developments in embodied and enactive cognitive science. It is the classic premises of 
cognitivism, especially internalism and representationalism, which make straightforward applications 
of enactive approaches to the FEP problematic [1,16]. We are not alone in developing anti-cognitivist 
formulations of the FEP from the perspective of enactivism. Work by Bruineberg et al. [13] and 
Kirchhoff [14,17] set the stage. Here is a list of the points on which we agree with Bruineberg et al. 
[13]: (a) the Helmholtzian view of perception as unconscious inference is inherent to cognitivist 
formulations of the FEP; (b) there are good reasons to think that this Helmholtzian view of perceptual 
inference is incompatible with approximate Bayesian inference under a non-cognitivist formulation 
of the FEP; and (c) once viewed through the lens of enactivism, the FEP can address how life and 
mind share the same set of basic organizational properties. The main difference between Bruineberg 
et al. [13] and this paper is that while Bruineberg et al. ([13]; see also [18]) aim to establish that the 
function of generative models is to maintain a robust brain-body-niche system (see [17] for a 
metaphysical treatment), we directly target a strong life-mind continuity thesis, further developing 
recent arguments in [14].  
We shall argue that non-cognitivist FEP, and its implications for thinking about the relation 
between life and mind, can be usefully constrained and augmented by key ideas in recent radical and 
autopoietic enactive approaches to cognitive science [14,17,19–22]. Our argument has two steps. The 
first addresses the nature of basic minds as selected by evolution for intentional directedness without 
semantic content [21]. The second step grounds the concept of basic minds in the concept of basic life 
cast in terms of autopoiesis and adaptivity [19,20]. Consequently, we arrive at a strong view of life-
mind continuity, and we avoid the cognitivist position of no-continuity between life and mind, while, 
at the same time, remaining far removed from the kind of mental bloat associated with overly 
generous FEP interpretations of the place of mind in the natural world (For other related but different 
articulations of the strong life-mind continuity thesis, see [23–26], especially [27]). 
2. The Free Energy Principle 
What is called the free energy principle (FEP) is an imperative for self-organization in open 
dynamical systems. It specifies that for living systems to maintain their structural and functional 
integrity they must minimize “free energy” in the context of active inference: they must change their 
relationship to their niche in order preserve integrity [4,10,14]. The FEP is therefore the claim that all 
biological systems must actively resist a natural tendency for disorder [13,28].  
Free energy was classically defined in terms of thermodynamic principles, but here we are only 
concerned with free energy cast as variational free energy that comes from probability theory and 
Bayesian statistics given that this is the conception of free energy involved in the FEP. Information 
theoretically, free energy is an upper bound on surprise (or formally, “surprisal”), where surprise is 
defined as the difference between an organism’s predictions (or anticipations) about sensory input 
and the sensory input it actually receives. Thus, surprise is a measure of improbability, and should 
not be confused with the psychological notion of surprise (though the two sometimes converge). 
Organisms that succeed in remaining far from terminal phase boundaries (and therefore are able to 
remain alive), the FEP mandates, “do so by minimizing their tendency to enter into this special kind 
of surprising (that is, non-anticipated) states” ([5] p. 1). 
The relationship between variational free energy and entropy should be understood in the 
following way. Free energy is an upper bound on surprise, and the long-term average of surprise is 
entropy. To see this more clearly, consider that a state can be said to have high surprise if it is deemed 
unlikely to occur relative to a generative model. The main idea is that organisms become 
(approximate) models of their local niche given that such systems, on average and over time, distill 
statistical regularities of their niche and thus come to embody such regularities in their gross-bodily 
form and internal global dynamics [10,11]. Were a state to be consistently high in surprise it would 
be a state with high entropy (with high statistical improbability). Alternatively, if a system is able to 
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predict the exteroceptive or interoceptive causes of its sensory input, it will be in a state with low 
entropy, and therefore low surprise. This is simply to say that expected states have a low entropy 
distribution. Conversely, the higher the average number of observations required to describe the 
dispersion of states for some random variable, the higher the entropy of that variable’s probability 
distribution As a result, the FEP states that living systems can maintain themselves within entropic 
bounds by seeking to minimize their free energy. 
Prima facie, at least, what the FEP makes possible is the generation of a deep and underlying 
unity connecting “processes of adaptation, mind, and life” ([5], p. 1) cast in terms of the information-
theoretic notion of free energy. All this is to say that what enables living systems to survive is the 
same process that enables such systems to perceive, act, think, and so on. Thus, the FEP gives hope 
of providing a single framework by which to unify theorizing about life and mind, and it does so by 
appeal to a single imperative: free energy minimization [4,10,11]. Hence, the FEP provides one with 
reasons for linking processes of life with processes of mind via what is essentially an uncertainty 
minimization view of life and mind. However, in the context of the FEP, closer inspection reveals a 
tension between different conceptions of how best to understand the implications of free energy 
minimization and the central properties that free energy minimization involves. 
2.1. Free Energy and Cognitivist Prediction Error Minimization 
Some free energy formulations add what we call a cognitivist constraint, which has implications 
for how such a view understands the life-mind relation. By cognitivist constraint we mean a 
constraint about the nature of the information processing in question; that it be thought of as the 
processing of representations with semantic content. In addition to positing semantic mental 
representations, cognitivist FEP also conceives of free energy minimization through a particular 
epistemological lens; namely that the free energy theorem leads to global skepticism with respect to 
the mind-world relation ([8], p. 2). Although there is much to be said about the epistemological 
implications of cognitivist FEP, we shall restrict our attention to the issue of semantic mental 
representations. 
Cognitivist FEP is usually framed almost exclusively within a particular understanding of 
approximate Bayesian inference cast in terms of “prediction error minimization” (PEM). Whereas the 
FEP takes its starting point in issues to do with self-organization in thermodynamic, non-equilibrium 
systems, and thus can be shown to apply to a wide range of different phenomena, prediction error 
minimization schemes have been more directly associated with brain functioning ([6]; see [1] for 
further references). Here the brain is depicted as a hierarchical generative model for minimizing a 
prediction error quantity reflecting the probability of sensorimotor input relative to an internal, 
knowledge-based, model. It is this knowledge-based formulation that adds the cognitivist 
assumption. We will unpack what we mean by this, since the FEP is generally taken to imply that 
internal states engage in Bayesian inference in which internal—comprising a system’s generative 
model—as well as active states can be modeled as minimizing free energy inferentially [29]. So, it is 
not the issue of inference or the possession of a generative model as such that exemplifies the 
cognitivist assumption. Instead, it is the particular properties associated with such inferential 
processes that highlight a particular, cognitivist take on free energy minimization. 
Cognitivist FEP gives special importance to internal, information processing with semantic (i.e., 
contentful) properties. This is a semantic view of the computational theory of mind, where internal 
representations are cast in terms of top-down probabilistic inferences on probability density 
distributions. Such a view of brain functioning is usually couched in the language of folk-psychology 
(the language of beliefs, desires, attention, and reasons), and proceeds from the premise that 
information processing with semantic properties is what constitutes cognition. The common reason 
for positing internal states with semantic properties is that unless there are such states they would 
not be cognitive, because purely physical systems would not be able to represent the world beyond 
their internal states. Since minds are generally assumed to manipulate representations and since most 
naturally occurring systems are not assumed to manipulate such things, it follows that cognitivist 
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FEP draws a hard line between mental and non-mental systems. For example, Hohwy [3,6,7] draws 
such cognitivist results from the FEP (but see also [30]). 
Work of this particular kind motivates what we referred to as an independence view of life and 
mind, placing the origins of mind later than those of life and treating the relation between the living 
and the mental in a contingent fashion. However, given its functionalist framework, this approach 
threatens to introduce a hard to explain gap between more complex and cognitive forms of life and 
the rest of the living realm, thus denying the possibility of any kind of life-mind continuity altogether. 
On such a cognitivist view of mind only some living systems have evolved the neural machinery 
capable of realizing information processing involving semantic properties.  
2.2. Non-Cognitivist Free Energy Minimization 
Other less cognitivist or even anti-cognitivist variants draw conclusions to the effect that one can 
endorse the FEP without endorsing a cognitivist reading of approximate Bayesian inference in the 
context of prediction error minimization. Non-cognitivist FEP casts free energy minimization in 
physical systems in terms of Shannon “entropy” in information theory [5]. Hence, it is possible to 
posit the FEP as the unifying principle of life and mind and, at the same time, deny that the most 
basic features of life and mind involve probabilistic inferences with semantic content, even if the basis 
of life and mind involves probabilistic inference (see also [10,14,29]). 
On some generous articulations of this view, free energy minimization is argued to occur not 
only in biological systems but to also take place in nonliving systems ranging from synchronization 
of clocks to the primordial soup and social networks [9,10]. Unlike cognitivist FEP, for which 
prediction error minimization is an evolutionary function of brains becoming hierarchical generative 
models, these “generous” views would seem to undermine the continuity and unity of life and mind. 
The reason for this is that their posited principle by which to unify life and mind applies to systems 
that are arguably non-living and non-mental. Yet, this presents some problems. The first is that if 
mentality is realized in processes of free energy minimization, and if free energy minimization 
applies to everything from human beings, pendulum clocks, to the primordial soup, then mentality 
may turn out to be nearly everywhere. Whether panpsychism of this form is correct is difficult to 
assess. But, without a clear way of separating mentality from non-mentality, or life from non-life, any 
overly generous version of the FEP becomes too general, thus losing its explanatory value for 
addressing the relationship between life and mind.  
In the next two sections, we turn to develop these two different formulations of the FEP for the 
life-mind relation, while considering the key assumptions made in both accounts to drive them 
toward their respective conclusions.  
3. From Cognitivist FEP to Life-Mind Discontinuity 
Some psychologists, neuroscientists, and cognitive scientists adopt the view that the mind can 
be explained in terms of computation, and add that minds are computational. The main assumption 
of their view is that computation cannot be explained without an appeal to semantic content and 
mental representation. This is no different for the cognitivist FEP. 
3.1. Concepts of Computation 
Hohwy [3,6,7] draws explicitly on the FEP to develop a theory of the brain as engaged in 
processes of prediction error minimization with semantic content. As we have seen, the FEP states 
that for organisms to remain far removed from terminal phase boundaries, they must minimize their 
free energy. Hohwy claims that this free energy formulation “corresponds to the brain’s job of 
minimizing prediction error, selective sampling of sensory data, optimizing expected precisions, and 
minimizing complexity of internal models” and that these job descriptions “map on to perception, 
action, attention, and model selection, respectively” ([3], p. 1). 
PEM is a computational framework. Here the computational functions realized by the brain are 
cast in terms of minimizing prediction error, reflecting the probability of sensorimotor input (or data) 
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relative to a statistical model. On this view, the brain is conceived as realizing the functional roles 
required to encode a brain-wide, non-local, hierarchical Bayesian generative model [31]. A Bayesian 
model is generative given that its function is “to capture the statistical structure of some set of 
observed inputs by inferring a causal matrix able to give rise to that very structure” ([32], p. 21). 
Hence, a generative model is a statistical model mapping hidden causes with sensory consequences, 
and therefore encoding prior probabilistic beliefs about which sensorimotor effects have which 
worldly and/or bodily causes [33]. This means that at each level of the brain’s cortical hierarchy, 
probability density functions are encoded of the prediction error signals arriving from the cortical 
level below [31].  
PEM combines this computational picture of the brain with the view that information processing 
is inferential, and says that inference should be understood as approximate Bayesian inference akin 
to something like hypothesis testing. Statistical inference in this sense is a tool of science. Hohwy 
adopts this view of the brain, as he notes “scientists are in the business of minimizing the error in 
predictions generated by their hypotheses” ([7], p. 3). There are different ways by which to engage in 
scientific hypothesis testing. One might tweak certain parameters of one’s model or one might 
intervene on the samples drawn in order to get a better match between the model and the samples 
one is sampling across. According to Hohwy, as “it is for statistical inference, so it is for the brain in 
perception […] and action” ([7], pp. 3–4). In perceptual inference, perception reduces prediction error 
in virtue of shaping prior predictions (i.e., probabilistic beliefs comprising the generative model). In 
active inference, action minimizes prediction error by working to change the sensory input itself 
through movement in the world [7]. This is perception and action, respectively.  
Prediction error minimization can thus be shown to map onto a computational mechanism, the 
generative model realized by the brain, which functions to minimize error signals ([6], Chapter 2). 
On such a view, concrete computational systems are functional mechanisms of a special kind [34]. 
Although the jury is still out about the specific implementation details, PEM is portrayed as offering 
new insights into the computational mechanisms underlying perception, action, attention and other 
cognitive processes. Mechanistically, following Hohwy, “this is done by suppressing prediction error 
at multiple levels of the temporally ordered hierarchy” ([6], p. 85). 
3.2. Concepts of Information: Toward a Semantic View of Computation 
The FEP models internal states as engaging in approximate Bayesian inference, and where the 
latter is implemented in processes of prediction error minimization. This is how the FEP and PEM 
converge with one another. However, the cognitivist formulation of the FEP adds an explicitly 
defined semantic dimension to the computational profile of PEM.  
To see what this involves, work is needed to arrive at what technical notion of “information” 
might arguably be involved in the computational processes of reducing prediction errors, on average 
and over time. It is possible to distinguish between different concepts of information. Here we 
consider three options.  
First, one might define information thermodynamically. A closed thermodynamic system, say, 
is one that has contact with its surrounding environment only in virtue of work and heat exchange. 
Thermodynamically, information amounts to a difference between two distinguishable states (e.g., 
high and low gravitational potential). It is common practice to think of this discrepancy in terms of 
information, thereby linking information closely to the thermodynamic notions of entropy and free 
energy. 
Second, one could also try to define information in information-theoretic terms. Here 
information is a measure of the mean of a probability distribution. Or, otherwise put, information is 
a measure of the average likelihood that some message is transmitted between a source and a receiver 
[35]. Friston [10] casts free energy minimization in terms of minimizing a surprisal quantity, and says 
that this concept of information should be understood in the precise sense of Shannon information 
[5]. Going further, consider what Godfrey-Smith and Sterelny say about Shannon information: “there 
is one kind of ‘information’ appealed to in biology, the kind originally described by Shannon, that is 
unproblematic […]. Information in this sense exists whenever there is contingency and correlation” 
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([36], p. 4). This gives us a picture where even simple life forms (e.g., bacteria) can be seen as tracking 
information and where information in this minimal sense can be shown to exist in complex systems 
such as brains and between organisms and their environment. Yet, it is important not to over-
intellectualize this notion. As Godfrey-Smith and Sterelny go on to stress, if we say that simple life 
forms can be understood as instantiating Shannon information, or if we say that genes contain 
information about the proteins they make, then “we are saying no more than what we are saying 
when we say that there is an informational connection between smoke and fire, or between tree rings 
and a tree’s age” ([36], p. 4). Indeed, according to Godfrey-Smith and Sterelny, Shannon information 
implies that “anything is a source of information if it has a range of possible states, and one variable 
carries information about another to the extent that their states are physically correlated” ([36], p. 1). 
Intuitively, the more one can infer about the state of one variable from the state of another, the more 
information the relation between the two variables conveys. This is also known as mutual 
information. Covariance is formally equivalent to mutual information in the following sense: if two 
variables stand in a relation of covariance, then information about one reduces “surprisal” about the 
other—which is just to say that covariance, just like mutual information, optimizes model evidence.  
Both thermodynamic and Shannon information cannot underlie the cognitivist formulation of 
the FEP. Hohwy frames hierarchical predictive processing as providing us with a representationalist 
picture of the nature of mind or cognition [7] (See [30] for endorsement of the claim that PEM is a 
representational theory of mind). However this immediately prevents both thermodynamics and 
Shannon information from playing much of a role in minimizing surprise under the cognitivist free 
energy formulation. The reason is straightforward. Even if tree rings are a source of information with 
respect to other possible states (a tree’s age), it does not follow that the rings represent anything at all 
about the age of a tree: the two states are informationally covariant; they are not in a representational 
relationship with one another. 
Hohwy’s representational gloss on minds is a more natural companion for a third concept of 
information, namely a semantic notion of information and thus a semantic view of computation. A 
semantic/representational account of computation imposes a semantic restriction. Piccinini puts this 
restriction as follows: “Only physical states that qualify as representations may be mapped onto 
computational descriptions, thereby qualifying as computational states.” ([34], p. 9) Piccinini 
continues by saying that the “semantic account is probably the most popular in the philosophy of 
mind, because it appears to fit its specific needs better than other accounts. Since minds and digital 
computers are generally assumed to manipulate […] representations, they turn out to compute” ([34], 
p. 9). So, cognitivist FEP posits that brains compute information, and where the relevant kind of 
information is the kind of information that we usually take to be important for epistemic purposes.  
As it stands, the Bayesian generative model, realized in the brain’s neural circuitry, is said to 
have a duplex representational architecture. This architecture is “one that at each level combines quite 
traditional representations of inputs with representations of error. According to the duplex proposal, 
what gets ‘explained away’ or cancelled out is the error signal, which (in these models) is depicted as 
computed by dedicated ‘error units’. These are linked to, but distinct from, the so-called 
representation units meant to encode the causes of sensory signals” ([1], p. 187; italics added).  
So what cognitivist FEP presents us with is a view of the mind as engaged in computational processes 
of semantic prediction encoded in hierarchical representations of exteroceptive and interoceptive 
states of affairs.  
3.3. Problems of Integration 
Cognitivist FEP raises the demands for information integration. In other words, sophisticated 
forms of computation cast in terms of semantic representational content would seem to place a high 
demand on the kind of onboard machinery required for the realization of such large-ranging and 
hierarchical generative models to get off the ground. It is machinery that many simple life forms and 
other organisms probably do not have, given that all the work of minimizing prediction error, 
selective sampling of data, precision optimization, and so on is taken to be “ordered hierarchically in 
the cortex” ([7], p. 15). Clark [12] draws precisely this conclusion. Considering very basic life forms 
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such as single-celled organisms capable of chemotaxis, Clark says: “Such a life-form may respond to 
environmental perturbations using a variety of tricks and ploys, none of which require it to engage in a 
process in which incoming sensory stimulations are met with attempts to generate the incoming signal 
‘from the top down’” ([12], p. 4). Furthermore, Clark claims that even if such bacteria are self-
evidencing in the sense of optimizing a model of their environment, such basic life forms “need not 
rely upon top-down predictions to structure and inform their exchanges with the wider world. 
Predictive processing thus constitutes a biologically plausible process theory that may or may not be 
implemented in any given system” ([12], p. 5). One way to read Clark [12] is to take him to say that 
while single-celled organisms are alive they are not cognitive given that they lack the kind of 
architecture required for a system to instantiate a hierarchical generative model by which to engage 
in probabilistic inference. Indeed, if central nervous systems in general and cerebral cortex more 
particularly are required for Bayesian inference, and it is this kind of process that is required for 
mentality, then this shortens the continuity between life and mind, carving off entire branches from 
the tree of life from having mental properties.  
This implies that some forms of life are without mind, while, at the same time, casting other 
(more neurally advanced) forms of life as wholly different in kind—being both alive and minded. 
Yet, this implies a deep separation between minds (with semantics) and the rest of the natural, living, 
and non-living world (without semantics), on the other. They are different in kind. 
3.4. Problems of Meaning 
The reliance of cognitivist FEP on semantic content raises a host of different issues about how to 
naturalistically explain semantic properties of mental representations, a problem to which we will 
return. Here we want to first draw attention to a different, yet related, issue. All physical systems can 
be understood in terms of Shannon information. However, on this conception information “is just 
information in terms of (meaningless) energy transfer and should not be confused with intentional 
or semantic content” ([13], p. 17). Yet, only some physical systems are generally assumed to 
manipulate representations with semantic content. A cognitivist formulation of the FEP along the 
lines of approximate Bayesian inference with semantic properties is therefore consistent with a 
picture that “keeps minds and computers in while leaving most everything else out, thereby 
vindicating the computational theory of cognition as a strong and nontrivial theory” ([37], p. 9).  
Although such a view of mind is attractive to defenders of cognitivist FEP, it faces immediate 
difficulties. Hohwy [3] makes use of the FEP to arrive at a cognitivist version of mind. But starting 
from the FEP, which starts with thermodynamic considerations about self-organization in random 
dynamical systems, does not license an inference to a cognitivist formulation of free energy 
minimization. The reason is that the FEP casts biological self-organization in terms of Shannon 
information, viz., in terms of covariance, physical correlation, and generalized synchrony. What 
follows from this?  
First, on a non-semantic formulation of the FEP, where information is understood in the sense 
of Shannon, the architecture of basic forms of cognition—e.g., adapting to and acting in a dynamic 
environment in more than a mere dispositional fashion—does not involve, necessarily, the acquisition 
and manipulation of internal states with semantic content [21]. Hence, cognitivist versions of the FEP 
place an unnecessarily high standard on what kinds of activities qualify as mental. Indeed, there are 
arguments that show (if correct) that information-as-covariance is not any kind of semantic content 
[21]. We elaborate on these points in Section 5. 
Second, minds have evolved “for getting things done in the world in real time” ([38], p. 5). 
Hence, minds (and brains) have evolved primarily for action and only secondarily for thinking, as 
traditionally conceived. Cognitivist formulations of the FEP downplay the centrality of action in favor 
of its computational all-stars: semantic information and top-down representations realized by 
neurally encoded generative models. Yet consider that actual sensory systems are “not concerned 
with truth and accuracy as such but rather, with action and the need to maintain the functional 
stability of the organisms in which they are embedded” ([39], p. 90). This sits uneasily with the 
epistemology of cognitivist FEP that posits internal states with truth and/or accuracy conditions that 
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link such internal states to states of affairs in the world. Consider (again) the case of chemotaxis in 
single-celled organisms such as E. coli. Chemotaxis is an example of a control mechanism employed 
by organisms to maintain homeostasis and thereby prolong the probability of their survival. In this 
case, it is the search for food (or sugars) based on the concentration gradients of chemical repellents 
and attractants in a bacterium’s fluid environment ([40], p. 311). Following Auletta [40], one can 
model chemotaxis as consisting in so-called homeostatic predictions or prior expectations endowed 
by natural selection, which approximate the external states that are preferred by the organisms—call 
these an organism’s intrinsic preferences (we shall return to unpack this notion in the last section). 
According to Auletta, “genetically endowed prior beliefs, entailed by the internal states and 
configuration of the organism … specify what is innately surprising and enable action to counter 
unpredicted deviations from expected states” ([40], p. 315). On this account, the embodied generative 
model of E. coli comprise prior beliefs specifying that it should strive to find itself in states with high 
sugar gradients, as opposed to the opposite. So, E. coli can be modeled as searching out these states 
through active inference. This puts action or action-oriented priors at the basis of homeostasis and 
life. There is no reason to think that this process involves semantic content—maintaining homeostasis 
is not a matter of having internal states with content that can be true or false depending on how such 
contents correspond to the states of affairs in the external world. Nor is there any reason to think that 
life-enhancing chemotaxis is bereft of mentality given that nothing prevents one from treating the 
incoming nutrients as sensory data, the cell membrane as a Markov blanket, and the continuing 
running and tumbling behavior of bacteria as cases of active inference. 
This difference in information-theoretic commitment—between semantic and non-semantic 
information—drives a wedge between life and mind. Life has a metabolic side. Metabolism is one of 
the key features of life [41]. Self-organizing systems can maintain their organization despite facing 
thermodynamic tendencies towards entropic disorder. What is required is that living systems are 
able to locate the right states in their overall state space that enables them to maintain themselves 
within viable bounds—as in the case of chemotaxis. For example, the “ideal temperature of a human 
is determined by its embodiment: at 37 °C the enzymes regulating metabolism perform optimally, 
while the metabolic costs of maintaining body temperature is still manageable within certain 
environmental conditions” ([13], p. 6). Higher temperature is equal to higher levels of surprisal, and 
vice-versa. The temperature gradient is a source of information. It is systematically related to an 
unknown probability distribution, in the sense that surprisal cannot be directly evaluated by an 
organism. However, this is simply to say that the information in question is one of covariation. It is 
not a representational, semantic state that carries contentful information about other states of affairs. 
Hence, basic forms of self-organizing processes in living systems have nothing to do with the 
requirements for mentality as posited by cognitivist FEP.  
Hohwy [3] assumes that a cognitivist reading of prediction error minimization is co-extensive 
with the FEP. We have argued that the technical conception of information used in the FEP (Shannon 
information) differs substantially from semantic information. We further argued that the former does 
not imply the latter notion of information, which is part of the reason for why a cognitivist 
formulation of the FEP ends up severing life from mind. In the next section, we turn to consider non-
cognitivist formulations of the FEP in more detail, and explore the implications for a life-mind 
continuity thesis on the basis of this non-cognitivist view of the FEP.  
4. From Free Energy Minimization to an Overly Generous Life-Mind View 
The FEP is an imperative for self-organization in dynamical systems. Given that life exists, the 
FEP states that living systems must exhibit the following properties. First, biological systems must 
have a model of how their sensorimotor input is generated and of the kind of states they expect to 
find themselves occupying. In other words, the FEP conceives of biological systems as close to 
optimal statistical models of their econiche. As Friston says: “the free-energy principle takes the 
existence of agents as its starting point and concludes that each phenotype or agent embodies an 
optimal model of its econiche. This optimality is achieved by minimizing free-energy, which bounds 
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the evidence for each agent (model), afforded by sensory interactions with the world” ([11], p. 89). 
The idea that a biological system embodies a model requires careful unpacking.  
One way to read this claim is that evolution has set up biological systems such that they, on 
average and over time, distill (i.e., extract) statistical regularities of their econiche, and therefore come 
to embody these in their model. This may be what leads defenders of cognitivist FEP to say the 
following: “The mind can then be understood in internalist, solipsistic terms, throwing away the 
body, the world and other people” ([7], p. 7). For once the biological system has distilled the statistical 
regularities of its econiche, it can throw it away, and rely instead on its internal model of the world. 
This is the representationalist implication of cognitivist FEP.  
Ergodicity and the Markov Blanket 
This is not how the concept of the model is understood in the FEP as formulated by Friston 
(Unless we explicitly add “cognitivist” to the FEP, we have in mind a non-cognitivist view of the FEP 
in what follows). The driving idea here is that a biological system is a model of its econiche [11]. As 
Friston puts it: a biological system “does not have a model of its world—it is a model. In other words, 
the form, structure, and states of our embodied brains do not contain a model of the sensorium—they 
are that model” ([10], p. 32). In this sense, each phenotype or living system “embodies an optimal 
model of its econiche” ([11], p. 89). Moreover, it is not only the biological system that can be said to 
embody the environment in which it is embedded, but “the environment embodies the agent” ([11], 
p. 89). Second, embodied models can thus be shown to rest on prior expectations about how 
environmental states unfold over time. This feature is also known as ergodicity. To say that a system 
is ergodic is simply to say that its states will tend to revisit a member of its attractive set over time, or 
that it will return—time and time again—to the same neighborhood in its state space during the span 
of its lifetime. In other words, ergodic systems will “occupy a small number of states with a high 
probability and avoid a large number of other states” [42]. 
The main points about how living systems endure over time apply as much to bacteria and 
plants as to organisms like us. This raises the questions about continuities and dis-continuities that 
we want to explore for the FEP. Answers to these questions are not well worked out in the literature 
on the FEP, and they tend to oscillate between radically different outcomes.  
In some passages, Friston’s formulation of the FEP seems to get us a deeply continuous view of 
the life-mind relation—what we called non-cognitivist FEP + strong life-mind continuity in the 
introduction. He emphasizes that there is more to life than mere self-organization. Living systems 
also “negotiate a changing […] environment in a way that allows them to endure over substantial 
periods of time” ([4], p. 422). In other words, they engage in adaptive behavior. Bruineberg et al. [13] 
characterize this adaptive ability as “an instance of what in philosophical phenomenology is 
described as being moved so as to tend towards an optimal grip” ([13], p. 10; see also [14,22] for 
similar remarks).  
However, in other passages, Friston pedals what seems to us to be a different and overly 
generous view of the non-cognitivist FEP. Consider, for example, this quote from Friston: the FEP 
“applies to any … system that resists a tendency to disorder; from single-cell organisms to social 
networks” ([9], p. 293). Or, as Friston says here: “The motivation for minimizing free energy has 
hitherto used the following sort of argument: systems that do not minimize free energy cannot exist, 
because the entropy of their sensory states would not be bounded and would increase indefinitely—
by the fluctuation theorem” ([10], p. 2). Strictly speaking, what Friston [10] says here is that for any 
system to exist it must work to minimize free energy. This commits Friston to one of the following 
three implications. First, if free energy minimization is sufficient for mentality, then every system has 
a mind, even if not all systems are alive. Second, if free energy minimization is enough for life and 
mind, then all systems that exist are both alive and mental. Finally, biological systems, like all other 
existing systems, need to work to minimize free energy. The last option states that free energy 
minimization is not a property of only living systems, and as such sets up one of the two following 
implications. Either (option one) the FEP places mentality in a class of systems that includes but is 
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not limited to living systems, and therefore veers toward some form of panpsychism. Or (option two) 
the FEP equates life-mind continuity with a view that sees life and mind nearly everywhere.  
Some scientists and philosophers have embraced the first option for their theories of mind (e.g., 
[43,44]). However, barring such panpsychist or pancomputationalist implications, it follows that free 
energy minimization in and of itself cannot be sufficient for life and mentality, even if it is a necessary 
property of all living and cognitive systems as a means to place an upper limit on disorder. What else 
might be required? Ergodicity does not seem to be enough for either life or mind given than any 
random dynamical system will display ergodic behavior because such a system will evolve over time 
to what is called its random global attractor [45]. Consider that flipping a fair coin not once but several 
times is an example of an ergodic process given that the probability of observing “heads” will 
converge as a function of time to the same value.  
In addition to ergodicity, Friston appeals to the idea that a Markov blanket bounds systems.  
A Markov blanket is comprised of sensory and active states, separating internal and external states 
(in the statistical sense of conditional independence). In a cell, say, the surface of a cell can be cast as 
constituting a Markov blanket, thus separating intracellular (internal) and extracellular (external) 
states. A Markov blanket can itself be further partitioned into perceptual/sensory states and active 
states [10,29]. Assuming that one can interpret internal states as parametrizing “some arbitrary 
(variational) density or Bayesian beliefs … about external states, then the dynamics of internal and 
active states can be described as a gradient descent on variational free energy” ([29], p. 3). In other 
words, one can describe the system in virtue of possessing a Markov blanket as maximizing model 
evidence via approximate Bayesian inference. Hence, the internal states of a Markov blanket can be 
said to infer the hidden causes of its sensory input either via perceptual or active inference.  
It is worth mentioning that not all phenomena possess a Markov blanket because it shows why—
from the perspective of the FEP—mere self-organization is enough neither for life nor for mind.  
A candle flame is a case in point. Although it can be shown to engage in self-maintaining processes, 
it does not do so recursively [46], and thus cannot ensure that the states comprising it and their 
interdependencies change slowly, which is required for a cell or an ergodic system to possess a 
Markov blanket [10]. In spite of these considerations about Markov blankets, the concerns we have 
raised here also apply to systems possessing a Markov blanket given that pendulum clocks can be 
modeled as comprising a Markov blanket, engaging in Bayesian inference, and to exhibit a degree of 
ergodicity [10]. In the case of pendulum clocks, Bruineberg et al. [13] have argued that the 
synchronization of chaotic systems can be explained more parsimoniously by appealing to 
generalized synchrony than by the idea that each clock infers the state of the other given that each 
clock can be understood as a model of the other’s internal dynamics. According to Bruineberg et al. 
[13], while it is entirely unproblematic to interpret this case in terms of Markov blanketed dynamics, 
it is not necessary to insist on an inferential reading—an appeal to generalized synchrony will do. We 
do not have a stake in this particular discussion. Here we merely point out that in other publications, 
Friston formulates generalized synchrony as consistent with internal states engaging in approximate 
Bayesian inference [47]. Our point is: given that the core concepts of non-cognitivist FEP—approximate 
Bayesian inference, ergodicity, Markov blankets and so on—can be applied to living and cognitive 
systems, on the one hand, and seemingly non-living and non-cognitive systems, on the other, there is a 
clear danger of these concepts being over-broad in their application, resulting in either seeing life and 
mind nearly everywhere or in the FEP lacking explanatory power when having to address the nature 
of life and mind and their relation to one another (Say the left hand side of this disjunction could be 
defended, then the overly generous non-cognitivist FEP would not exemplify an independence view 
of life and mind but rather an extreme version of the dependence view of life and mind, given that 
life and mind would essentially be everywhere). 
5. Restricting Non-Cognitivist FEP with REC: An Evolutionary Latecomer View of the Mind 
Our strategy now will be to show that the implications for the overly generous view of non-
cognitivist FEP can be restricted. Instead of placing mentality outside the domain of life, or even 
thinking that everything that exists is life-like and therefore mind-like, we shall argue that such 
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implications can be usefully constrained by work in radically embodied enactivism (REC) in 
naturalistic philosophy of cognition [21,48]. This restriction will help us in taking first steps toward 
developing a view of non-cognitivist FEP that avoids any kind of appeal to panpsychism, and where 
the presence of mental semantic content (i.e., internal states with correctness conditions) marks a 
transition within the realm of the mental—as opposed to highlighting a path from the non-mental to 
the mental.  
The main commitments of REC can be articulated in two basic tenets. The first is a denial of the 
“usual” view in the cognitive sciences and its philosophy; namely, that cognition, in some 
fundamental sense, involves contentful mental representation. That is, according to REC, “the vast 
sea of what humans [and other organisms] do and experience is best understood by appealing to 
dynamically unfolding, situated embodied interactions and engagements with worldly offerings” 
([48], p. 1). The second is the claim that these kinds of basic cognitive activities are realized in an 
organism’s world-engaging, bodily activity [21]. We now turn to highlight two points of convergence 
between REC and non-cognitivist FEP.  
First, they both emphasize co-dependence between the internal and external. Recall that the FEP 
casts the biological system as a model of its econiche, and adds to this that the econiche is a model of 
the biological system. For example, the spider’s morphology, possibility for action, and so on, are 
reflective of its niche, while the web and its wider embedding environment reflect the kind of 
organism that inhabits it. To be clear, the FEP does posit a separation of internal and external states—
the Markov blanket implies such a separation [28]. However, unlike cognitivist FEP, it does not follow 
that any such separation is indicative of an epistemic separation. So, the mere existence of a Markov 
blanket does not entail that the internal states of an organism must represent states beyond the 
blanket in virtue of constructing internal states with semantic content about those external states. 
Rather, it suggests in a similar sense of the enactivist claim that “the organism and environment are 
bound together in a reciprocal specification and selection” ([49], p. 174; quoted in [32], p. 289). Allen 
and Friston emphasize this mutuality between the internal and external, as they say: “The point is 
that the boundary itself is constituted by ergodic dynamical interchange between ‘internal’ and 
‘external’, rather than a cognitivist performance of internal processing” ([28], p. 16). REC casts this 
mutuality between the internal and the external in the form of covariance, which is an expression of 
how two or more variables change (or do not change) together. Covariance is formally equivalent to 
the emergence of generalized synchrony that results from active inference—a corollary of the FEP 
(see [47])—and expresses a dynamic coupling of two or more random dynamical systems. In this 
sense, both REC and the FEP formulate, from basic principles, why one should expect shrinkage in 
entropy given generalized synchrony or covariance in agent-environment couplings. Akin to active 
inference in the non-cognitivist FEP, REC understands the assembly and orchestration of such 
dynamic couplings to be a result of embodied activity.  
Second, the non-cognitivist FEP and REC conceive of the kind of information available to a 
biological organism to be of the Shannon variety. However, where the FEP assumes this kind of 
information to provide an account of self-organization in biological systems [5], REC draws an 
additional implication that is intended to raise a serious problem for all cognitivist theories of mind, 
including cognitivist FEP [21]. Cognitivist FEP assumes that any kind of intelligent interaction with 
the world demands semantic content. Yet, this assumption runs afoul against what Hutto and Myin 
[21] dub the hard problem of content. As they say: “positing informational content is incompatible with 
explanatory naturalism. The root trouble is that Covariance doesn’t Constitute Content” ([21], p. xv). 
The driving idea is that semantic content does not exist independently of certain socio-cultural 
practices. Hence, semantic content is not an inherent property of biological systems and therefore not 
of life ([21], p. xv). 
We do not comment on the relation between content and social practices (but see [50]). Instead 
we shall hone in on the following implication: assuming that information-as-covariance cannot give 
rise to information-as-content, and assuming that responding adaptively to information-as-
covariance is an essential property of living and cognitive systems, then mentality is not in its most 
basic forms a matter of processing any kind of content. It is precisely for this reason that we argued 
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that cognitivist FEP leads to a no-continuity or independence position with respect to the life-mind 
relation. We based this claim on the observation that cognitivist FEP cannot help itself to the kind of 
information at the base of the FEP as it applies to self-organization in biological systems, namely 
information-as-covariance, to account for processes involving semantic information, and that this 
thereby forces it to exclude most processes in biology from the domain of the mental.  
REC goes further than just problematizing cognitivist theories of mind. It develops a positive 
picture of non-contentful cognitive activity. According to REC, if one denies that any kind of 
organismic interaction with the world must, necessarily, involve content, it does not follow that this 
kind of interaction is, necessarily, non-mental. On this view, it is possible for organisms to be 
intentionally directed—to be active, involved in world-directed engagements, and to be informationally 
responsive—without directedness of this kind being mediated by internal states with semantic 
content. As Hutto and Myin say: “The simplest life forms are capable of an intentionally directed 
responding” ([21], p. x), but this responding is not a matter of interpretation, understanding, or any 
other kind of sophisticated representational activity.  
REC develops its account of non-contentful intentional directedness via a modified version of 
teleofunctionalism. Simply put, teleofunctionalism is the view that what makes something a mental 
activity has to do with the function it serves for an organism. The notion of function is cast in terms 
of proper (biological) functions, and such functions are commonly understood in light of the 
evolutionary and/or historical conditions under which the respective functions were selected for 
and/or acquired. Hence, teleofunctionalism explains why an organism has certain mental and 
biological capacities by appealing to the kind of operations that such functions were selected for in 
order to increase the probability of surviving and striving.  
Many teleofunctionalist are representationalists about mentality. REC rejects this representational 
commitment of teleofunctionalism. According to Hutto and Myin [21], the intentional directedness of 
basic forms of cognitive activity—e.g., a frog flicking its tongue to catch a fly—are constituted by their 
natural history of selection. We made the same point as we discussed chemotaxis in single-celled 
organisms above. This implies that intentional directedness has a normative dimension. An 
intentionally directed form of activity (of the non-semantic kind) “aims at engendering certain types 
of organismic responses to certain things (or types of things) and not others” ([51], p. 142). A nice 
outcome of REC is that it implies a view of mind within which a transition from contentless to 
contentful activities does not mark a transition from no-mind to mind. REC is thus a transformative 
theory of mind within the mental realm.  
Not all naturally occurring systems satisfy REC’s condition for mentality. That is, not all things 
that exist exhibit intentional directedness. A thermometer, for example, does not. This is not because 
such a device lacks systemic functions of the kind that are defined by the role they play for the device. 
According to REC, such machinery lacks the kind of natural selection history associated with proper 
biological functions, which is required for a system to exhibit intentional directedness. Assuming that 
REC’s proposal is along the right track, developing non-cognitivist FEP under the auspices of REC’s 
teleofunctionalism would thus imply the following important constraint: that only a subset of free 
energy minimizing systems are intentionally directed at certain features of their local environment, 
and therefore only a subset of such systems are mental.  
This issue requires a lot more discussion than we shall attempt here. Nonetheless, the distance 
between non-cognitivist versions of the FEP and REC is not very large—at least not once an appeal 
to a history of selection is recognized. Thus we read: “according to RPP [i.e., radical predictive 
processing based on the free energy principle] prediction error unfolds not only at ontogenetic but 
also phylogenetic timescales; if the brain (and body) constitute a generative model, then those 
[generative models] best suited to their environmental niche will be selected by evolution” ([28], p. 9). 
This is revealing. Allen and Friston [28] here recognize the need to develop a view of generative 
models, dynamic coupling, and bodily activity along the lines suggested by REC. By recognizing this 
overlap between non-cognitivist FEP and REC, we thus arrive at the idea that it is possible to develop 
a non-semantic view of free energy minimizing organisms, and to do so in a way that does not lead 
to unconstrained mental bloat.  
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Nevertheless, we will now argue that REC stops short—in the sense of undercutting—a strong 
version of the life-mind continuity thesis (Note that stopping short of a strong life-mind continuity 
thesis does not entail that REC faces a fatal dilemma when having to account for the origins of content 
in naturalistic terms (see [52] for discussion)). By extension, if the non-cognitivist FEP were to be 
developed within the confines of REC, it too will stop short of arriving at such a strongly unifying 
view of life and mind. The reason for this is that once REC is added to the FEP, this addition results 
in an evolutionary latecomer view of mind. REC places the origins of life prior to the emergence of 
mind, given its adoption of teleofunctionalism. It follows that REC can be characterized as accepting 
the following three claims: first, that there is life but no cognition; second, that there is life and that 
life and mind converge when living systems become capable of non-contentful forms of intentional 
directedness; and finally, that certain kinds of living systems (human beings, for example) are able to 
engage in cognitive activity with semantic content (such a writing and performing mathematics). We 
do not deal with this last implication of REC. Instead we focus and have focused on the second claim, 
which is the claim that for REC organisms come to exhibit mentality—defined as intentional directed 
actions—given a selection history. Thus, if added to the FEP, REC narrows the scope of non-
cognitivist FEP, given that this appeal to a history of selection would then imply that the very first 
life forms do not have mental properties given that such life forms would not (at least not yet) have 
a history of natural selection. 
We take issue with this view of the life-mind relation that REC entails, especially since it is 
somewhat unclear what explanatory work the appeal to selection is doing. Consider, e.g., when the 
first living system begins to divide. This process results in a number of clones of the first individual 
system. Yet, given environmental fluctuations, not all clones are able to survive. This raises a 
question: Have the survivors been “naturally selected”? If affirmative, then the survivors have 
intentional directedness, and the others do not. However, it is likely the case that there is no notable 
functional difference between the original individual and any of its clones—independent of them 
surviving or dying. The implication of this would thus be that physiologically identical organisms 
could differ in terms of mentality, raising a philosophical worry similar to the one evoked by the 
“swamp man” thought experiment or the notion of philosophical (free energetic) zombies.  
Furthermore, the appeal to “selection” raises additional issues. For example, at which point can 
we say that a function was “selected”? Is it the moment when the function for the very first time 
contributes to an organism’s relatively higher rates of reproduction compared to its conspecifics? Or 
does it require several generations of individuals with above average fitness? And how can this 
particular function’s contribution to fitness be non-trivially disentangled from the myriad of other 
contributing factors? To be sure, there is no doubt that over generations natural selection can change 
the particular way in which organisms are intentionally directed to their environment, but it is not 
clear whether this evolutionary process should be taken as constituting this very intentional 
directedness as such (and hence, basic mentality) in the first place. 
6. From REC to AE and Non-Cognitivist FEP: Strong Life-Mind Continuity 
We finally suggest a way by which to positively rehabilitate the above problem, and we do this 
by showing that non-cognitivist FEP is also in line with autopoietic enactivism, enabling us to weave 
the origins of life together with the origins of mind (This account is a further development of the line 
of argument pursued in [14]).  
REC assumes as its starting point that there is a population of individuals that can be shaped by 
the forces of natural selection. However, what precisely is an individual? (We are not in a position to 
discuss this in depth here—a task for another occasion. However, for an initial detailed discussion 
see [53] and the rest of the papers in this special issue in Biology and Philosophy). If this concept is too 
broad, then it is hard to constrain the notion of intentional directedness appropriately, since many 
kinds of systems undergo histories of some kind of selection with regard to their functioning, like a 
thermostat. Moreover, it is undeniable that the thermostat’s functioning can be described normatively, 
namely in terms of whether it correctly regulates temperature or not. However, its designers and 
users specify the conditions of “correctness” externally, and therefore its normativity is only a derived 
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kind of normativity. This is not so for the case of living systems. For example, our bodies are also 
continuously regulating their temperature so as to maintain it within specific boundaries. According 
to the FEP, this is achieved by free energy minimization, on average and over time. This function is 
also subject to conditions of success and failure, but here the conditions are intrinsic to the body rather 
than externally defined for the simple reason that they are determined by a range of viability, which 
ultimately is a question of existence, of life and death [28].  
To be fair, even a malfunctioning thermostat may eventually disintegrate from overheating. 
However, this is not sufficient to attribute to it an intrinsic form of normativity. The key difference is 
that our body, or any living system for that matter, and in contrast to the thermostat, is a physically 
self-producing system (autopoiesis). Living is a process that maintains itself under far-from-
thermodynamic-equilibrium conditions by investing work into preventing its own disintegration. In 
this manner it must define a boundary between what belongs to itself and what belongs to its 
environment. This boundary defines it as an autonomous individual. According to non-cognitivist 
FEP, such a system is an adaptive system capable of active inference with a Markov blanket, where 
the Markov blanket does not entail anything like an epistemic boundary demarcating mind from 
world. Whereas the mode of being of a thermostat is characterized by passive persistence, an 
organism is characterized by active existence (or, active inference). Additionally, because an 
organism’s being is its own doing, its existence as an individual is inherently precarious, and yet 
living beings generally do all they can to maintain their way of life against all odds. That is, despite 
the possibility of simply letting themselves to succumb to the forces of decay and disintegration, they 
consistently regulate their boundaries to avoid this fate. In other words, living beings do not simply 
passively undergo perturbations like non-living systems, they respond selectively and the success of 
this response is normatively linked to the preservation of their way of life.  
So, autopoietic enactivism (AE) provides us with the beginnings of an account of how the origin 
of life is also the origin of autonomous individuality and of intrinsic normativity (the origins of 
systems maintaining the internal states of their Markov blankets via active inference). However, at 
first this normativity is not specific to any particular function but rather concerns the individual as a 
whole: all activity that does not kill the individual has a positive value for the living system. Activity 
that kills the individual would have a negative value except that it can no longer be so for the system 
(which is gone). In order to be able to function in a more discerning manner it is necessary for the 
living system to be able to respond in a differential manner and particularly to detect and avoid 
potentially lethal interactions before they turn out to be lethal. It is unlikely that this kind of complexity 
can spontaneously emerge at the origin of life. Instead it requires a history of selection, conceived of in 
general terms as the outcome of interaction, development, and evolution. In other words, here is where 
AE connects with the concerns of REC and intentional directedness enters the picture as a way to 
adaptively respond to relevant features of the inner and outer milieu of the organism. While AE helps 
REC to appropriately constrain its appeal to selection history, REC in return can help AE to bridge the 
“cognitive gap” [26] between basic minds and non-basic minds. 
Approaching intentional directedness in this manner has the advantage that it arrives in the 
context of an autonomous individual that is already actively distinguished from, as well as related 
to, what is other (its environment), and whose activity is already intrinsically characterized by a basic 
form of holistic normativity. Additionally, there is no need to worry about the mental status of 
artifacts with artificially selected functions, since they lack the criteria of basic life (autopoiesis and 
adaptivity, see [54]). Intentional directedness is, in this view, effectively a refinement and elaboration 
of a basic existential profile by means of selective history. The conditions of what REC considers a 
basic mind, namely an autonomous individual having intrinsic normativity, would already be in 
place. If so, then we may say that basic mind and basic life arose together at the origin of life, a 
momentous event, which then should be reconceived of as the origin of life-and-mind—as the origins 
of organisms with Markov blankets capable of maintaining their own internal states (or processes) 
through active inference (In this paper we have taken steps towards developing an approach to the 
strong life-mind continuity thesis that can bring together key insights in the free energy principle 
with the latest work in enactive cognitive science. However this task is far from finished. We suspect 
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that future work on this project will seek to evaluate the FEP not only in relation to the REC and AE 
frameworks but also in terms of other accounts of predictive and anticipatory dynamics. For work 
already started in this direction, see [55–57]). 
7. Conclusions 
If something like the FEP is in the right ballpark for addressing the life-mind relation, then life 
and mind co-emerge within the broader class of processes pertaining to the minimization of 
uncertainty. However, there is no singular account of this general class for thinking about the relation 
between life and mind. In this paper, we have explored two different FEP perspectives on the life-
mind relation. First, we argued that cognitivist FEP implies that there is no continuity between life 
and mind. Essentially, cognitivism’s appeal to semantic content as the mark of the mental places a 
very high bar that can only be passed by a small number of recent species and potentially by their 
artifacts. Second, we then argued that overly generous formulations of non-cognitivist FEP threaten 
to imply that mentality is nearly everywhere.  
To avoid these implications, we then argued that a non-cognitivist version of the FEP could be 
helpfully constrained by integrating it with key ideas in enactive cognitive science about individuality 
and normativity. Finally, we concluded that the most compelling account of the relationship between 
life and mind treats them as strongly continuous, and that this continuity is based on particular 
concepts of basic life (autopoiesis and adaptivity) and basic mind (intentionally directed yet non-
semantic) in the context of the free energy principle. 
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